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We prefer settlements and have

designed asystem of civil justice that
embodies and expresses that preference
in everything from the rules of procedure
and evidence, to appellate opinions, to
legal scholarship, to the daily work of our
trial judges. Our culture portrays trial especially trial by jury - as the
quintessential dramatic instrument of
justice. Our judicial system operates on a
different premise: that trial is a disease not generally fatal , but serious enough to
be avoided at any reasonable cost.
Preference for settlement is not unique
to the American legal system but it is
especially pervasive and strong, for
several reasons. We have many lawyers,
by any count, but few judges. As a result,
we have very many litigated disputes per
judge - so it is essential that most cases
be resolved without judgment. This
scarcity of judges is possible because of
our adversary system of adjudication. In
this system the parties control the
development and presentation of facts;
the fact finder Qudge or jury) is passive,
and has a comparatively small role in the
process. Party control of evidence makes
private settlement easier, since the parties
themselves, rather than the court, procure
the information they need to negotiate.
Adversary fact finding is also expensive,
unpredictable (especially if the ultimate
tribunal is a jury), and, given our scarcity
of judges, slow. As a result, the savings to
be realized by settlement - in time,
money and risk - are greater than they
might be in a quicker, cheaper and more
predictable system. These explanations, of
course, are not independent of each
other. On the contrary, the major
structural reasons for the special
importance of settlement in American
litigation - scarcity of judges and
abundance of lawyers, adversarial fact
finding, trial by jury - are all
manifestations of a single cultural value:
the preference for private ordering over
public control.
Trials, of course, are important beyond
their numbers. For the public, trials have
the advantage of visibility. They are open
and dramatic while settlements are
usually boring and private - in fact,
invisible. Their openness also makes trials
attractive subjects for study by scholars,
with the added benefit that cases that are
fought to the end are likely to present
more of the issues that we like to study
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and need to teach. But for practitioners
trials are important primarily because
they influence the terms of settlement for
the mass of cases that are not tried because they cast a major part of the legal
shadow within which private bargaining
takes place. Trials have this standard-setting
effect despite the fact that they are not
typical of the cases in which their results
are used as guides for settlement.
Scholars are unanimous in recognizing
that trials are not representative of the
mass of litigated disputes. They seem to
be selected because of unusual rather
than common features, such as high
stakes, extreme uncertainty about the
outcome, and reputational stakes of the
parties. Liebeck v. McDonald~ Restaurants
(1994) is an extreme case, but a useful
example nonetheless.
On Feb, 27, 1992, Mrs. Stella Liebeck,
aged 79, a passenger in a car driven by
her grandson, bought a cup of coffee at a
take-out window of a McDonald's in
Albuquerque. With the car stopped, she
held the styrofoam cup between her legs,
tried to pry off the top, and spilled the
coffee - which was scalding hot. She
suffered third degree burns. She sued,
and three years later a jury returned a
verdict against the McDonalds Corporation
for $160,000 in compensatory damages
and $2 .7 million in punitive damages.
The verdict became an instant cliche in
the tort reform debate. At first, it was the
ultimate jury-trial horror story: Woman
gets $2.86 Million For Spilling Her
Coffee. Later, it re-emerged as a tale of
justice done: Mrs. Liebeck was severely
injured - she was hospitalized for eight
days and required skin grafts; she was
irtjured because of McDonalds policy of
serving coffee 15 to 20 degrees hotter
than its competitors; McDonalds knew
the danger of selling coffee at that heat it had received 700 prior complaints in
the previous five years, some involving
serious burns - but it never considered
changing its practice; the $2.7 million
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there is almost always a clear loser, and usually a clear winner as well.
punitive damage award was chosen by
the jury to be equal to two days worth of
coffee revenue for McDonalds; the trial
judge reduced the total award to
$640,000; in the aftermath of the case,
McDonald's lowered the temperature of
its coffee.
Needless to say, Liebeck v. McDonalds
was an unusual trial. The damages were
unusually high, and the facts of the claim
were uncommon, to say the least. In
many respects, however, it is a perfectly
representative example of an American
civil jury trial - as we shall see.
To understand civil trials in America it
is necessary to consider them in the
context of the pretrial bargaining in
which civil litigation is usually resolved.
That is what we attempt in this article,
using two samples of civil jury trials in
California state courts, one from 19851986, and one from 1990-1991. Both
samples were drawn from case reports
in Jury Verdicts Weekly, a state-wide
California jury verdict reporter that is
widely used by lawyers in evaluating their
cases - in other words, our data were
generated by one of the instruments
through which trials cast their shadows
over settlement negotiations. For the
second sample, we also interviewed 735
attorneys who represented a plaintiff or
defendant in one of the cases, and asked
them about insurance coverage, fee
arrangements, the parties' pre-trial
bargaining positions, and the factors that
drove the cases to trial. This survey
provides unique data.
For this article, we assembled a
statistical portrait of the civil jury-trial
caseload of the California State Superior
Courts, the state courts of general
jurisdiction. Briefly, we find that most
civil jury trials in California (over 70%)
concern personal injury claims of one
sort or another; that almost all plaintiffs,
in trials of every sort, are individuals; that
the overwhelming majority of these
plaintiffs (especially in personal injury
cases) pay their attorneys on a contingent
basis; and that almost all defendants,

except some large businesses and most
government entities, have insurance that
covers the cost of defending the lawsuit
and all or some of the potential damages.
The typical civil jury trial is a personal
injury claim by an individual against a
large company, in which neither party is
playing with its own money: the plaintiff
is represented by an attorney whose fee
and expenses will be paid out of the
recovery (if any), and the defendant has
an insurance policy that covers all
defense costs and any likely judgment.
Liebeck v. McDonalds fits all those criteria,
except that the defendant may well have
been self insured.
Three notable outcomes emerge from
the outcomes of these trials:
First, most of the total sum of money
awarded in these trials is concentrated in
a small number of very large cases.
Second, the pattern of outcomes in
personal injury trials is very different
from that in commercial trials. Plaintiffs
lose most personal injury trials - that is,
they do less well at trial than they would
have by settling - while defendants are
more likely to lose in commercial trials.
On average, personal injury verdicts are
roughly midway between what the
plaintiffs demand and what the
defendants offer in settlement; on
average, commercial verdicts are
considerably larger than the plaintiffs'
demands as well as the defendants' offers.
Third, jury verdicts are rarely
compromises. Compromise, of course, is
the essence of settlement, but
compromise judgments are also possible
at trial. In fact, they hardly happen.
When civil disputes end in trial there is
almost always a clear loser, and usually a
clear winner as well.
Here, we examine the role of trial in
American civil litigation, and consider
possible reforms. The key question is:
Why are compromise verdicts so

uncommon? We offer a structural
explanation: This is a natural
consequence of a legal system in which
settlement and trial are mutually
exclusive rather than complementary
methods of dispute resolution, and it is
exacerbated by the high cost of trials.
Very few cases go to trial, and those that
do are atypically difficult disputes that
could not be compromised by the parties
and are not likely to produce compromise
verdicts. Once again, Liebeck v. McDonalds
is a good illustration. The defendant
passed up many opportunities to settle,
starting with a $2,000 demand by the
plaintiff before she filed the complaint,
and ending with a $225,000
recommendation from a mediator. At
trial, the issue was framed in all-ornothing terms: The Case of the Careless
Customer vs. The Case of the Callous
Corporation. The verdict was much larger
than any proposed settlement, but
judging from public response it could just
as easily have been zero.
The trials we see are the products of a
procedural system that is devouring itself. _
As we have refined and elaborated the
rules for jury trials we have multiplied
the costs of trial both to the parties and to
the courts. The costs to the parties drive
them to skip all these expensive
procedures and settle; the costs to the
system drive judges and rulemakers to
find new ways to encourage them to do
so. Increasingly, the cases that litigants
insist on trying are not only rare but
peculiar. In a sense, the Liebeck trial was
common even in its peculiarities. It is
misleading to hold up Liebeck as a typical
example of American litigation: car
accidents and medical procedures must
generate a thousand lawsuits for every
coffee-bum case, and punitive damage
awards in any amount are rare in
personal injury trials. But trials are never
typical. Ordinary cases of every sort are
compromised and settle, and those that
don't are unusual even if the context is a
garden-variety two-car crash. Trials are
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the most visible aspect of our system of
adjudication, and they show it at its
worst: the slowest, most expensive and
most contentious cases, where
compromise has failed, and where the
verdict is most likely to seem arbitrary
or extreme.

Why are civil jury verdicts
so uncompromising?
In most trials there is at least one loser.
This may not sound surprising - it may
even seem obvious - and for that reason
it is important to remember that losing is
not an inevitable feature of adjudication.
"Winning" and "losing" are defined by
reference to the alternatives, and in this
setting the common alternative is
settlement. A "loser" at trial is someone
who does less well than she could have
by accepting an available settlement offer
from the opposing side - and a "winner"
is someone who does better by that
standard - considering both the
judgment and the cost of obtaining it. By
that definition, it is perfectly possible for
a trial to produce a "win/win" outcome,
an adjudicated compromise between the
pretrial positions of the parties. However,
judging from these samples, "win/win"
outcomes are rare in civil trials in
America - by our estimates, 4% to 7%.
When one side wins the other almost
always loses. And when one side loses the
other usually wins; all around disasters in
which everyone takes a beating are also
uncommon - by our estimates, 9% to
14% of civil trials. In the great majority of
the cases, perhaps 80% to 85%, the
verdict is a clear victory for one side and
a clear loss for the other.
Why are compromises so rare among
the small percentage of cases that go to
trial? The major reason seems to be
structural: the sharp division we draw
between settlement and adjudication. In
any system, the parties to a litigated civil
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dispute are allowed - indeed
encouraged - to try to settle their
differences on their own. Even if they fail,
they are likely to resolve some issues
along the way, and to narrow their
differences. In the United States, however,
these partial compromises generally come
to naught if the case proceeds to a jury
trial. The dispute shifts to a new mode adjudication before a fact finder who was
not party to any prior partial
compromises, under rules of procedure
that make reference to settlement
discussions improper. At trial all deals are
off, and all risks are restored. If you fail to
settle you must drop out entirely or pay a
lot to gamble at high stakes.
This is not the only way to run a
court. In Germany, for example, the
process is very different. As in America, a
primary goal of the system is to facilitate
settlement, but that is done by very
different means. German civil procedure
does not distinguish between trial and
pre-trial proceedings. Each case is
assigned to a single judge, who actively
oversees it from start to finish. Along the
way, the judge will convene a series of
hearings or conferences with the
attorneys and parties, identifying and
resolving issues, taking testimony and
hearing argument as necessary,
attempting at each stage to focus on the
legal and factual disputes that must be
resolved in order to end the case, either
by adjudication or by a settlement that
completes the court-assisted convergence.
A typical California Superior Court
case, by contrast, is set before a series of
judges who know little about it and who
play limited reactive roles at various steps
along the way Pre-trial negotiation and
much of pre-trial litigation go on in
private with no judicial oversight at all.
The first point at which a judge is likely
to take part in an attempt to resolve the
case is a settlement conference close to
the date of trial, after the parties have
failed to settle on their own and have
invested a great deal in trial preparations.
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If that too fails, there is a trial from
scratch before a jury that (by definition)
knows nothing of the history of the case.
Actual practice in each country is
variable and complicated. For the
moment, however, it may be useful to
reduce these two systems to ideal types:
Court-assisted settlement backed up by
court-imposed compromise, vs. private
settlement with a high-price poker game
as the penalty for failure . The second
system, which is pretty much what we
live with in America, might as well have
been designed to discourage trials. And it
does, very successfully; thats why civil
trials are so rare.
Few people want to go to trial under
these circumstances, or at least they are
not willing to own up to it. For our
second sample of trials we asked the
attorneys directly: "Why did this case go
to trial rather than settle?" We classified
the first reason given by each respondent
as follows: Did the attorney say that her
side (the party or its attorneys) was
responsible for the trial, or did she say
that the other side was responsible, or did
she mention some other cause? A clear
pattern emerged immediately: Each side
says the other one did it. Fifty-four
percent of the plaintiffs' lawyers said the
defendant or the defense lawyers caused
the trial, 19% said their own side did it,
and 2 7% gave some other reason. On the
defense side, 41 % blamed the opposition,
27% blamed themselves, and 31 % chose
some non-party cause. This tendency is
as pronounced among winners as among
losers. For example, 54% of the plaintiffs'
lawyers who recovered nothing at trial
blamed the defense for the failure to
settle, as did 64% of those who recovered

'

more than $500,000. Attorneys who won
hundreds of thousands of dollars said
they were forced to court by the
defendants stupidity, and others who
successfully defended big claims said trial
was caused by the plaintiffs greed or
craziness. Almost nobody said "We
gambled and lost" or "We decided to
fight, and we won."
This is the way people talk about
unfortunate events - wars or losses, not
adventures or victories. That attitude is
no surprise, not even coming from
lawyers. Attorneys, like insurance
adjusters and other regular players in
litigation, make their daily bread in
negotiation. When a case falls through
the cracks into the other costlier and
chancier arena, their reaction reflects the
judgment of the system as a whole: A trial
is a failure . This view of trials is related to
their outcomes in two ways. First, as a
cause: The (accurate) belief that trials are
expensive and risky is a powerful
incentive to settle those cases that can be
settled - to compromise whenever
compromise is possible, and to avoid trial
at all costs when the stakes are too small
for either side to come out ahead. That
leaves a residue of all-or-nothing cases
that resisted compromise before trial and
are likely to produce all-or-nothing
verdicts after trial. Second, as a
consequence: The fact that trials usually
are expensive winner-take-all affairs
reinforces the consensus that they are
dangerous and to be shunned.
And what are these stubborn,
uncompromising cases that end in trial?
Judging from our data, they are primarily
disputes over liability rather than
damages. In part, that is inherent in the
nature of the issues: Damages is a
continuous variable, and therefore more
susceptible to compromise and
settlement. In addition, if damages were
the main issue in contention at most trials
we would expect to see more

compromise verdicts. A case in which
liability is given may go to trial if either
party is overly optimistic in its prediction
of the award, or overly aggressive in its
bargaining, but it is most likely to go to
trial if both sides are unrealistically
optimistic or overly aggressive - if the
plaintiff asks for too much and the
defendant offers too little. When that
happens, the verdict is likely to fall
between their bargaining positions, and
may well be a win/win outcome. The fact
that such verdicts are rare suggests that
damages is not often the main issue at
trial.
Liability, by contrast, is a dichotomous
variable. If damages are known and
liability is at issue a trial can only be
avoided if the parties agree on a
discounted figure that reflects the actual
damages multiplied by some estimate of
the likelihood that a jury will find the
defendant liable. Pre-trial bargaining will
reflect this logic. The plaintiff will not ask
for more than the known damages,
although in an extreme case she may
demand no less, while the defendant will
offer some fraction of the real loss, or
nothing at all. If the case does go to trial
the jury is likely to side with the
defendant and to give the plaintiff
nothing, or to side with the plaintiff and
give her as much as or more than she
demanded in settlement. And indeed, one
or the other of these outcomes occurred
in about 77% of our cases. In other
words, trials over liability will produce
the all-or-nothing battles that we mostly
see - cases in which one side always
loses, and the other side almost always
wins.

Why do we have trials at all?
Considering the cost and risk, the
interesting question about American
litigation is not why there are so few
trials, but why we have as many as we
do. The obvious problem is resources:
How can litigants afford to go to trial?
The key is that the costs and risks are
aggregated across many cases, through
the twin institutions of contingent fees
and liability insurance. Almost all
plaintiffs in our cases are individuals, and
nearly half of defendants are individuals
or small businesses. Such parties, on their
own, could rarely muster the funds or the
nerve to conduct a Superior Court trial.
The plaintiffs would settle or dismiss; the
defendants would settle or default. But a
plaintiff with a contingent-fee attorney or
a defendant with an insurance company
can afford to go ahead, even to trial. As a
result, plaintiffs' attorneys and liability
insurers play a major role in determining
who has access to court. In most cases, a
plaintiff who can't get a contingency fee
lawyer probably won't be able to sue; one
reason plaintiffs' attorneys may decline to
take a case on a contingency is that the
defendant is uninsured - which means
that, except for large institutions,
uninsured defendants are unlikely to be
sued, and if they are sued, they are
unlikely to be able to defend themselves
through trial.
But contingent fees and insurance only
make trials possible. They do not explain
why civil trials actually occur, or tell us
what functions trials serve (if any) in a
system in which 98% of disputes are
resolved by settlement. The possible
explanations fall into three categories:
guidance for settlement, strategic
bargaining and strategic intransigence,
and non-economic interests.
1. Guidance for Settlement. Every
theory of pre-trial bargaining assumes
that a negotiated settlement is
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determined, at least in part, by the
parties' predictions of the outcome of the
case if it did go to trial. Needless to say,
such predictions are uncertain, and that
uncertainty may affect the terms of a
settlement. For example, a risk-averse
plaintiff may accept less than the
expected value of her claim because she
is unwilling to take the chance of an
unlikely but possible defense verdict. But
there must be some common basis,
however shaky, for assessing the
consequences of a failure to settle. If trials
became vanishingly rare lawyers and
litigants would make increasingly crude
predictions of trial verdicts. As a result
there would be more cases in which their
ill-informed guesses would be too far
apart to compromise; which would lead
to more trials, more verdicts, and better
information on trial outcomes; which in
tum would produce more settlements,
and reduce or stabilize the trial rate. For
all we know, the few trials that now occur
are pretty close to the minimum number
our settlement-dominated system
requires.
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2. Strategic Bargaining and Strategic
Intransigence. In litigation, as in other
adversarial contexts, many of the moves
in negotiation are "strategic" - ploys that
are used to mislead and manipulate.
Thus litigants will conceal or distort
information to impress their opponents,
demand things that they don't want to get
other concessions that they do, and play
chicken with the opposition in order to
get paid to avoid trials that nobody
wants. When strategic bargaining works
it improves the terms of settlement you may get an additional $20,000 out of
a defendant by convincing him that
otherwise you'll go to trial even if it costs
you $100,000 - but if he calls your bluff
the result may be no settlement at all.
Our data show clear signs of this sort
of strategic bargaining. For example, most
defendants in our commercial trials made
puny settlement offers and then got
hammered in court. In 1985-86 the offers
in commercial trials averaged $574,000
less than the verdicts and the defendants
lost 67% of the trials; in 1990-91 they
averaged $1,710,000 less and the
defendants lost 55% of the time.

Wouldn't it have made simple economic
sense for many of these defendants to
offer more and settle instead of losing? In
some individual cases, of course, that
must be true, but overall we think not.
For the most part the plaintiffs in these
cases played along with the defense and
made puny demands - on average
$322,000 less than the verdicts in 198586 and $710,000 less in 1990-91 - in
contrast to personal injury plaintiffs,
who demanded on average a great deal
more than the juries gave them. If the
commercial plaintiffs who ultimately went
to trial were willing to settle for that little,
those who did settle may have agreed to
take an even smaller fraction of the jury
value of their claims. Why? The great
majority of these commercial plaintiffs are
individuals, and (unlike personal injury
plaintiffs) most of them must pay some or
all of the costs of trial: over a third pay
their lawyers at least partly by the hour,
and two thirds advance at least a portion
of the trial expenses. Very likely most of
these plaintiffs were reluctant or unable
to invest money in litigation, even in

winning cases - and the defendants can
take advantage of their timidity by
sticking to low-ball offers. That strategy,
however, requires the defendant to
maintain a posture of intransigence: Take
$20,000 or go to trial. This may be the
best approach, and it may work 95% of
the time, but when it fails the result
probably won't be a settlement for
$100,000 but an expensive trial followed
by an even larger verdict.
When a party to a dispute is a repeat
player - a person or an institution that
participates in a steady stream of litigated
cases - it has an additional incentive to
behave strategically: to influence the
outcomes of other cases. For example, a
newspaper may refuse to ever settle any
defamation claim, regardless of the merits
or the cost, in order to discourage libel
suits by building a reputation as a
stubborn and expensive opponent. On
the other hand, a manufacturer may
quietly settle a products liability case in
order to avoid a public trial that could
produce a dangerous precedent if the
manufacturer loses, and might provoke
other similar lawsuits even if the
manufacturer wins.

The most common repeat players in
civil litigation for monetary damages are
not parties themselves but agents of the
parties - plaintiffs' attorneys and
insurance companies. This creates the
possibility of conflicts of interest. On the
plaintiffs side, the attorney may want to
go to trial to establish herself as a winner,
or at least as someone who will fight to
the expensive end. Such a reputation
might bring in business, it might even
help future clients, but it has no value to
the current one-shot plaintiff. On the
defense side, the most common potential
conflict occurs in cases with doubtful
liability and damages in excess of the
liability limit of the defendant's insurance
policy If the plaintiff makes a demand at
or near the policy limit, the defendant
will probably want to take the settlement,
which is free to him, rather than risk a
trial after which he might be stuck with
personal liability for damages above that
limit. Most liability insurance contracts,

however, give the insurance company the
power to accept or reject settlements, and
the insurance company may prefer a trial:
It can't lose more than the policy limit
one way or the other, and, for the price of
trying the case, it might save itself a
settlement of about that amount.
We don't doubt that plaintiffs'
attorneys and defendants' insurers
sometimes act in conflict with the best
interests of the parties. But we don't
believe that such conflicts (strategic or
otherwise) are a common cause of trials.
Taking a case to trial against the interests
of the client violates professional norms,
and may subject the attorney or the
insurance company to formal or informal
sanctions. Norms and sanctions don't
eliminate abuses, but they do suggest that
the disfavored behavior is the exception
rather than the rule. In this context, our
survey data are consistent with that
expectation. The attorneys we interviewed
frequently said that the trial was caused
by the opposition's stupidity or
stubbornness, but no defense attorney
said that there was no settlement because
the plaintiffs attorney wanted a shot at a
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Almost nobody said "We gambled and lost" or "We decided to fight, and we won.'
major verdict, and no plaintiff''s lawyer
said that it happened because the
insurance company had little to risk at
trial and was unconcerned about its
insured.
If we ignore occasionally serious
conflicts and assume that attorneys and
insurance companies handle these cases
in the best interests of the parties, then
the repeat players in ordinary civil
litigation are all on the defense. Plaintiffs
are almost always individuals and
therefore necessarily one-shot players,
while defendants, if they are not large
businesses or government entities - and
therefore likely to be repeat players in
their own right - are almost always
insured, usually completely. In other
contexts, repeat players may just as easily
be plaintiffs. This is true of some private
litigants (e.g., environmental groups) and
it is the rule for public litigants: the
Internal Revenue Service, regulatory
agencies, and, most important, criminal
prosecutors. If a repeat party is a plaintiff
it can set its agenda and influence law
and practice by its filing strategy. Indeed,
that is likely to be its main tool, since
nothing that happens later is as influential
as the decision to file in the first place especially since most repeat player
plaintiffs see many more possible cases
then they can ever handle.
A repeat player defendant can hope to
exercise some control over the general
pattern of litigation, but only through its
settlement strategy. Unlike a repeat player
plaintiff, it has no other way to send
signals or channel cases. The only
ultimate threat it can make is the threat of
trial, and it must take some cases to trial
to keep that threat credible. Therefore we
would expect the defendants in these
ordinary civil cases to be more likely than
the plaintiffs to engage in strategic
bargaining, and more prone to take cases
to trial for strategic reasons. Our survey
data support this prediction. Although

82 THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL

each side was apt to say the other caused
the trial, overall the attorneys were more
likely to say the defendants rather than
the plaintiffs did it, 52% to 42% .
One way to influence litigation is to
win most trials, and repeat players on
both sides do just that. The non-repeat
player opponent is more risk averse;
therefore, the repeat player plaintiff
(e.g., prosecutor) can win most trials by
taking strong cases to court and offering
defendants in weak cases deals that they
are afraid to refuse, and the repeat player
defendant (e.g., insurance company) can
do the same. Plaintiffs win most cases in
both situations, usually by plea bargain or
settlement: repeat players or not, they
rarely file unless they expect to win. But
the repeat player plaintiffs (prosecutors)
also win 75% or more of criminal trials,
while insured civil defendants (who settle
and pay up on most claims) win
approximately 70% of personal injury
trials.
Our settlement data show clear signs
of strategic bargaining by defendants that
is aimed at goals beyond the outcomes of
the trials at hand. Many of these cases
went to trial without any meaningful pretrial negotiations because the defendants
made no settlement offers whatever.
These zero-offer cases make up over a
quarter of all trials, and about 60% of
medical malpractice trials. A zero offer is
never a reasonable assessment of the
expected cost of a case to a defendant.
The trial itself is never free and usually
expensive, and there is always a chance,
however low, that a jury will side with
the plaintiff. But unlike the low-ball
strategy that defendants seem to use in
commercial cases, making zero offers is
not a promising way to avoid trials. If no

face-saving settlement whatever is offered,
a plaintiff who has already filed and
pursued a case may well plow ahead to
the end, at high cost to everyone. This is
particularly true in personal injury cases,
where the costs of trial are usually born
by the plaintiffs attorney - a repeat
player who has the money to spend, and
who can afford to lose most cases as long
as she wins some big ones. On the other
hand, a defendant (or his insurer) might
make such an offer to affect other
litigation. Refusing to settle increases the
risk to future litigants and may
discourage future claims, and taking
winners to trial may be worth the cost if
it helps you bluff successfully in
negotiations with plaintiffs in future
cases.
3. Non-Economic Interests. Trials
may also occur because the parties have
non-economic interests in obtaining
judgments. Several scholars have
discussed the importance of one
particular non-economic motive: the
desire to have a day in court, to obtain
formal justice. They claim that many
litigants want a type of satisfaction that
settlement rarely provides - public
vindication - and they argue that
vindication is a goal that our legal system
should promote.
Our interviews with attorneys in the
1990-91 trials provide some hints on the
role of non-economic stakes in civil trials.
For the most part, our findings are
negative. In 735 interviews, only three
attorneys mentioned a desire for
vindication as an explanation for why
their case went to trial. Two attorneys said
their case was tried because a party
demanded her day in court; they were on
the opposing sides of the same case, and
each pointed his finger at the others
client. Only a few attributed trials even in
part to the desire of a client for a hearing
or a public judgment. Nor did any other
non-economic motive surface as a
common explanation for these trials.

Why is vindication all but ignored by
those attorneys as an explanation for
trials? There are several possibilities. The
attorneys may undervalue their clients'
desire for vindication and focus on their
clients' (and their own) economic
interests in the litigation. Some attorneys
may have become so acculturated to the
professional view that trials are bad that
they fail to notice that their clients
actually want to go to court. If so, they
might underestimate the role of noneconomic factors in the clients' trialseeking behavior: if a desire for
vindication is driving their cases to trial,
they don't see it.
It is also possible that the clients in
most common litigation in California
courts don't care much about having their
day in court. Despite what some scholars
think, they may in fact have no
preference for public adjudication over
private settlement unless there is an
economic advantage. Finally it may be
that many plaintiffs and defendants
would prefer vindication at trial to private
settlement, but they do not have the
power to act on that preference and force
a trial, since the defendants insurance
company and the plaintiffs attorney
usually control the settlement decision.
As the result, few of the cases that do go
to trial get there because of a partys
desire for vindication.
Other less direct data suggest that a
desire for vindication was indeed at the
root of many trials - at least in one type
of case. As we've seen, 27% of these cases
did not settle because defendants offered
nothing to the plaintiff, at any point in
the pretrial proceeding. This "zero-offer"
rate varied across types of claims, from a
low of 11 % to 15% in vehicular
negligence trials, to a high of 59% to 60%
in medical malpractice trials. We believe
the high rate of zero-offers in medical
malpractice cases is best explained by the
desire of physicians for vindication at trial.

Most physician malpractice insurance
policies sold in California contain a
"consent to settle" clause which requires
the agreement of the doctor to any nonzero settlement negotiated by the insurer.
Lack of consent is mentioned by an
attorney as a cause of trial in 19 of the 32
1990-91 zero-offer medical malpractice
trials, and we suspect that it was a factor
in at least several other medical
malpractice trials in which no attorney
specifically mentioned it. We also know
that the trial rate in medical malpractice
cases is considerably higher across the
nation than for any other category of
personal injury litigation, and that
doctors win defense verdicts in more than
90% of the cases in which there is no
settlement offer at any point in the
litigation. What explains these patterns?
What seems to be happening is that
doctors are insisting on trial in some
medical malpractice cases in which they
expect to obtain public vindication. This
is most likely to happen when the doctor
is convinced that she acted in a
professionally responsible manner, but
has nonetheless been wounded in her self
esteem and damaged in her reputation by
a patients claim that she committed
malpractice. Cases where the defendant
feels like that all the way up to trial are
likely to be winners for the defense. In
other contexts, insurance companies
settle most odds-on winners for
comparatively small amounts, in order to
save trial costs and to minimize risks.
Not here. Unlike other litigants, doctors
have negotiated insurance contracts that
give them the power to make that choice
themselves. Moreover, since the insurance
company remains responsible for the

defense costs and for damage awards at
trial, the defendant doctor can usually
reject a low settlement without
undertaking personal liability for legal
costs or for any judgment within policy
limits. The usual result is a trial that the
insurance company pays for, and the
doctor wins. In other words, at least in
one type of litigation where reputation
and vindication are particularly
significant for a coherent constituency of
defendants, those defendants have been
able to order their private relationships
with their insurance companies in a way
that protects that interest.

How might we change
this system?
As we noted at the outset, a major and successful - goal of lawyers, judges
and rule makers is to promote
settlements. We do not advocate an
attempt to further reduce the extremely
low trial rate in our civil courts, but if a
further reduction is sought, our research
suggests that some methods are more
likely to succeed than others.
The techniques of encouraging
settlement can be roughly divided
between two approaches. The first set of
techniques rely on information. They
attempt to achieve settlement by
providing unbiased information to the
parties about the dispute. The second set
of techniques rely on incentives. They
encourage parties to settle by increasing
the risks or reducing the rewards of
proceeding to trial.
Information based techniques include
judicially-supervised settlement conferences,
mediation, and most other forms of
court-sponsored dispute resolution. The
theory is that if both parties to a dispute
confront an evaluation of their case by a
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disinterested expert they are more likely
to converge on a single estimate of the
outcome, and to agree to settle. While
such techniques may contribute to the
existing low trial rate, our data suggest
that they are unlikely to succeed in
squeezing out many more trials.
Mediation and similar procedures are
probably most effective in helping the
parties close the gap in their predictions
of the jurys evaluation of damages, but
that doesn't seem to be the main problem
in the cases that go to trial. Predicting
verdicts on liability is another matter.
Most litigants on both sides already
discount their estimates of damages in
light of their uncertainty about the jurys
decision on liability: On the plaintiffs
side, that explains the large number of
judgments that exceed the plaintiffs
demand; on the defendants' side it
explains the fact that in most cases with
zero awards the defendants did offer
money to settle the claims. The trials that
occur nonetheless are primarily in cases
in which the parties remain so far apart in
their predictions of the decision on
liability that they are willing to gamble on
the jurys notoriously unpredictable
verdict. In that context, no information
from a disinterested expert is likely to
change their minds.
The alternative to attempting to
provide more information about the
outcome of the case is to alter the rules
under which it is litigated. The common
method is to increase the risk of trial by
requiring the losing party to pay some or
all of the winners' legal fees. Other
proposals change the structure of
incentives at trial by limiting the damages
that a party may recover, or the fees that
its attorney may receive. We do not
necessarily advocate such changes, but
we do believe that they have greater
potential to depress the trial rate than
attempts to provide more information to
litigants who are already willing to bear
the risks and costs of gambling on trial
84
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you must drop out entirely or pay
a lot to gamble at high stakes.
.
on the basis of the best information they
have been able to obtain. By changing the
structure of costs and rewards it is
possible to change the odds of favorable
outcomes for one side or the other, or for
both, across whole categories of cases.
The result might be an overall change in
the pattern of civil litigation, including,
perhaps, a reduction in the number
of trials.
Or perhaps not. For example, consider
the effects of eliminating contingent fees
altogether - an extreme proposal, and,
in our opinion, an extremely bad idea. If
that happened the number of civil law
suits would be reduced drastically, at least
in the short run; and the distribution of
cases that were filed would change
dramatically (e.g., a higher proportion of
the remaining filings would be in
commercial cases); new institutions
would be created to cope with the new
needs generated by the system (e.g., new
systems for paying legal fees, including
perhaps new forms of insurance); the
pattern of settlements and trial outcomes
would change in unforeseeable ways; and
the number of trials might go down. But it
also might not. It could turn out that we
would still need as many trials as we now
have, or more to define the contours of
the new system.
Procedures that affect the risks of trial
may also have the opposite effect. The
risk of large jury verdicts on the one
hand, and of defense verdicts on the
other, weigh heavily in favor of
settlement. Ancient procedural devices
such as remittitur and additur, and newer
ones such as damage caps and limitations
on punitive damages, should (if anything)

increase the percentage of filed cases that
proceed to trial. In addition, or instead,
the parties to a lawsuit may agree
privately to restrict the risk of extreme
outcomes at trial. A striking example is a
technique known as the "high-low
agreement."
A "high-low agreement" is a partial
settlement in which the plaintiff and the
defendant each insure the other against
an extreme verdict. The plaintiff agrees to
collect no more than a maximum amount
specified in the agreement, regardless of a
higher jury verdict, while the defendant
agrees to pay no less than a minimum
amount specified in the agreement,
regardless of a lower jury verdict. Highlow agreements have been reported since
at least 1968. They are usually reached
shortly before or during trial, particularly
in personal injury cases involving large
potential damages and uncertain liability;
they are legal and enforceable.
High-low agreements permit private
parties to limit the scope of a jurys factfinding on damages in ways that go
beyond those permitted by the rules of
evidence and summary judgment. Under
this procedure, trial outcomes are
constrained by the settlement negotiations
that preceded them: the agreement to
participate in this constrained trial is the
last step of an incomplete compromise.
The availability of this option (if the
parties are aware of it) will tend to
discourage full settlements and to
facilitate trials. Its no secret that our
system of civil justice has generated a
pent-up demand for low cost litigation. As
a result, a procedure that lowers the cost
of litigation -for example, a small-claims
court - will increase the volume of
litigation and the number of trials (albeit
cheaper, quicker trials). The development
of the high-low agreement demonstrates
the existence of a parallel demand for low
risk adjudication. Any technique, public
or private, that reduces the range of

.

possible outcomes at trial could help
answer that demand by making trial less
scary, which might encourage more
parties to take their chances and try it.

Conclusion
The essence of adversarial litigation is
procedure. We define justice in
procedural terms: the judgment of a
competent court following a trial that was
procedurally correct. When we want to
improve our judicial system we pass a
procedural reform, which invariably
means elaborating old procedural rules or
adding new ones - rules that govern the
presentation of evidence and arguments,
rules that create opportunities to
investigate and to prepare evidence and
argument, and rules that are designed to
regulate the use of the procedures that are
available to investigate, prepare and
present evidence and argument. The
upshot is a masterpiece of detail, with
rules on everything from special
appearances to contest the jurisdiction of
the court to the use of exhibits during
jury deliberation. But we can't afford it.
As litigants, few of us can pay the costs of
trial; as a society, we are unwilling to pay
even a fraction of the cost of the judicial
apparatus that we would need to try most
civil cases. We have designed a
spectacular system for adjudicating
disputes, but its too expensive to use.
We respond to this dilemma on two
levels, private and public. The private
response is to create institutions that
enable parties to aggregate the costs, risks
and benefits of litigation across many
cases: liability insurance for defendants,
to pay for legal fees as well as damages,
and contingency fees for plaintiffs. These
structures make it possible for parties to
prepare for trial, and to retain trial as an
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option. The public response is to actively
discourage trials. We provide some
positive assistance in reaching
compromises, but the main push is
negative: Litigants learn to avoid trial in
order to reduce their risks and save their
money. Formal litigation is presented not
as an adjunct but as an alternative to
private settlement; not as an aid but as
a threat.
The main function of trials is not to
resolve disputes but to deter other trials.
And they do, very effectively. One
consequence is that those few cases that
do go to jury trial - perhaps 2 % of civil
filings, and less than 1% of all civil
claims - are very different from the mass
of cases that settle. They are typically
high-risk, all or nothing cases, cases with
unusual facts or intransigent parties, cases
that defy compromise. Their outcomes,
by comparison with ordinary work-a-day
.settlement cases, are costly, unpredictable,
and sometimes bizarre. Since jury trials
and jury verdicts are the most visible
products of litigation, these extreme and
unrepresentative cases distort public
perception of the administration of civil
justice. In the process, they perpetuate
the image of litigation as terror, which
helps drive all but the most hopeless
disputes out of court, which means that
any general policy based on what
happens in those cases that are tried will
be misconceived.
In 1921 Learned Hand wrote that "as a
litigant I should dread a law suit beyond
almost anything else short of sickness and
death" - a widely repeated and
deceptively simple sentence. Judge Hand's
statement was not intended as a report of
an idiosyncratic aversion, but as a
judgment by one who ought to know
that litigation is dreadful. Lesser judges
and mere lawyers mostly agree, including
us. Our research adds evidence to
support one part of this widely shared
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belief: those lawsuits that are fought to
the end are indeed risky, costly, and
unpredictable.
Hands main message, of course, is not
a description, but an injunction: Don't
litigate. It is a concise expression of the
repeated advice of generations of
conscientious lawyers: Anticipate
problems and avoid conflicts; if conflicts
arise, resolve them privately; if at all
possible, don't sue. And when lawsuits
are filed, this advice is transformed into
the mantra of the judge: Settle. Every day
in countless settlement conferences trial
judges sell their own versions of Learned
Hands wisdom: "They're offering you
$70,000. A jury could give you
$150,000, but I've seen folks just like you
come up empty, lots of times. If it were
me, I'd be scared; I'd take it." More often
yet, this lecture is delivered by lawyers

long before any judge enters the picture.
There is another injunction that could
be embedded in Judge Hands aphorism:
Our system of justice is terrible, and we
must change it. But we don't understand
him that way anymore than we interpret
him to mean that a dispute is an injury
and a lawsuit the process by which it is
healed. We not only accept as a fact that
it is the lawsuit that is the disease, we
seem to relish it. If trial were a safe, soft,
reassuring process, many more disputants
would seek trial and the courts would be
overwhelmed; they're struggling as it is at
a 2% trial rate. But there's no cause for
concern. The major elements of the
system - adversarial factfinding, trial by
jury, contingent fees, liability insurance
- all fit together to make trial the
dangerous event we need to drive nearly
everyone to settle.
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